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Throughout the twentieth century, business elites in the United States were bound together by a dense interlock
network — a network of directors connected by serving on the same corporate boards, and of boards connected by
shared directors. A few dozen directors served on five or more boards, and this inner circle kept the informational
pathways among corporations short. Most large companies were within three degrees of separation: a director from
company A and a director from company B would be connected by a common co-director. This dense web of
personal and corporate ties played a crucial role in maintaining a cohesive elite identity and a moderate political
orientation in the U.S., and in diffusing corporate governance innovations.
Our recent study finds that this network fell apart during the first few years of the new millennium, with important
consequences for U.S. corporations and society. The inner circle of directors sitting on many boards has all but
disappeared. In 2000, 61 directors served on five or more major corporate boards; by 2012, there was only one.
Without a critical mass of well-connected directors, the interlock network no longer coheres (Figure 1). Each
company is connected to fewer other companies, and the social reach of directors through the interlock network is
curtailed.
Figure 1. S&P 500 interlock network main component, 1996 (left) and 2010 (right). Dots are
companies. Two companies are connected by a line if they share a director.
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Why did the inner circle disappear? The long-standing, rich-get-richer preference for well-connected directors
disappeared. Throughout the twentieth century, directors serving on multiple boards were more likely to be invited
onto yet more boards. Serving on many boards was a signal of high status. But after a series of corporate scandals
in the early twenty-first century, culminating in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley act, directors serving on many
boards came to be viewed with suspicion. Forbes magazine called such directors “overworked”, others called them
“busy”, “overboarded”, even “greedy”, and influential advisors such as Institutional Shareholder Services called for a
limit on the number of boards a director served on. When the old guard of well-connected directors retired, no others
could amass the board seats to take their place, and the inner circle vanished.
This change in network density affects the shape of U.S. society. In the 1980s, Michael Useem described how the
inner circle of well-connected directors maintained elite class identity. A newly appointed director assuming his first
board seat could catch the eye of a member of the inner circle, who would sponsor him for additional board seats
while nudging him towards appropriate corporate and political views. Once the new director became a member of
the closely-connected inner circle of directors, he would in turn sponsor and tutor promising new directors. Now,
however, the probability of a new director serving on a board with another who is on many boards is tiny. Moreover,
even directors serving on many boards are often not closely connected to each other. The ladder that led to the
inner circle of the interlock network is broken. Indeed, there is no inner circle left to join. The interlock network is no
longer a crucible of elite class consciousness.
The decay in network connectivity also limits the interlock network’s role in diffusing innovations across corporate
America. Examining the spread of poison pill anti-takeover provisions in the 1980s, Jerry Davis found that adoption
spread through a board-to-board contagion process, much like a flu virus. Companies that shared directors with
multiple companies who had already adopted poison pill provisions were highly likely to adopt the provision
themselves. By 2010, the interlock network was too sparse for such processes to function. The typical company no
longer has enough board links to allow for multiple exposures to previous adopters. Corporations may look less like
each other now as a result.
Corporate practices were not the only things diffusing across the interlock network; the network served as a
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substrate for diffusing political views also. Serving on the same board pulled directors closer together in their political
opinions. A densely-connected single network brought directors of many differing political orientations into close and
repeated contact with each other. The most-connected directors—the inner circle—came to hold moderate and
pragmatic political views, close to an average of the views of the directors across the network. Mark Mizruchi and
other scholars found that rather than donating to only Republicans or Democrats, directors in the inner circle often
contributed funds to both sides of the aisle and supported middle-of-the-road policies designed to stabilize the status
quo.
The less-connected network of today allows polarised political action by corporate elites. Directors in the interlock
network are less constrained by the web of connections to their peers, and can act on their own idiosyncratic beliefs
and ideologies. Figure 2 shows results of our simulation of political contributions by corporate directors. The
simulation predicts that directors in 2010 would be much less likely to donate similar amounts to both Democratic
and Republican political candidates compared to directors in 1997, because directors in 2010 were connected to
fewer peers with dissimilar political orientations. Unfettered by ties to a broad range of peers, each corporate
executive and director can deploy his considerable resources for his own company’s advantage or to push his own
ideological stance.
Figure 2. Simulated distribution of number of executives by proportion of political
contributions allocated to the Republican Party.
The corporate interlock network is not the only possible forum for elite interaction. Are there other networks (private
equity?, nonprofit boards?, social clubs?) which now serve to unify the U.S. elite? Recent developments in U.S.
society, such as the success of decidedly non-centric politicians such as Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump,
suggest that no replacement has crystallized yet. Without structures binding elites to each other through dense and
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far-ranging ties, powerful men and women in the U.S. are free to pull society in many different directions.
For a take on how our research relates to elite political participation and the rise of Donald Trump, see Corporate
America’s old boys’ club is dead – and that’s why Big Business couldn’t stop Trump
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